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CONTRACTUAL SOLUTIONS FOR
EMPLOYMENT LAW PROBLEMS
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN*
It is my very great pleasure to speak at this general session of
the Federalist Society on the vexing topic of employment law.
It is a subject in which I have had a long-term interest, and on
which I have done a fair bit of legal and theoretical work. In a
previous talk, Commissioner Chai Feldblum of the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission emphasized the im-
portance of empirical work in order to get a grip on how the
system works. Her implicit assumption is that we should be
skeptical of theoretical accounts of the determinants of success
and failure in labor markets. No one should of course turn a
blind eye to empirical information, but the emphasis that is at-
tached to it all too often becomes a recipe for total and absolute
stasis. The data is always incomplete. The studies are often too
esoteric. The chains of inference are long and disputed. Rival
interpretations are often inconsistent, and hence those who like
the status quo ante use the claim for empirical research as a
barrier against a revisiting of policies that I regard as far too
interventionist in labor markets. No one did any empirical re-
search to introduce the current m6lange of employment law.
No one needs to do a great deal of empirical work to start
down the road to dismantling the structure.
In making this claim I do rely on some gross empirical data,
which is readily available from standard sources, and which
makes sustained calls for more empirical research unwise and
unnecessary-at least if its purpose is to guide reform efforts.
The basic numbers of youth unemployment are very grim, and
show that this situation is widespread with special pressure on
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members of minority groups. The available data does not paint
a pretty picture.' Indeed, when one looks at the youth unem-
ployment rate today (in this instance for sixteen- and seven-
teen-year-olds) we find that the numbers are virtually indistin-
guishable from the period between 1950 and 1955, when there
were no protective laws on the books and systematic forms of
segregation existed. 2 Starting in 1955 or so, the unemployment
picture for both black and white males got worse, and the gap
between black and white employment rates rose dramatically,
even as the minimum wage compressed wages. What is strik-
ing about this early data is that the changes during this period
of time, including an increase in minimum wage laws, had a
differential effect between the groups, with a worse effect on
black males. The simplest explanation is that earlier unem-
ployment rates may have been roughly equal because the wage
rates may have been lower for black workers, reflecting their
weaker job qualifications at the time. This is a classic case in
which institutional changes left both groups worse off.
The question then is what drives these changes, and here the
theory tells a picture that is all too clear: regulation. The sim-
plest graph of the effect of the minimum wage law shows that
if the wage is constrained, supply will exceed demand at that
level. This change means that the number of employment con-
tracts formed will be fewer than would be the case if the re-
straint were removed, which would cause wages to fall and
employment levels to rise. Labor markets are devilishly com-
plex, but one thing that is sure today is that there are many
forms of labor restrictions today not in place in the 1950s that
help account for increased unemployment rates.
1. See, e.g., BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, USDL-14-1498, EM-
PLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT AMONG YOUTH SUMMARY (Aug. 13, 2014), available at
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/youth.nrO.htm [http://perma.cc/9U4P-W5JY].
The number of unemployed youth was 3.4 million in July 2014, down from 3.8
million a year earlier. The youth unemployment rate was 14.3 percent in July
2014, 2.0 percentage points less than a year before. Among the major demographic
groups, July unemployment rates were lower than the prior year for young men
(15.1 percent), young women (13.4 percent), whites (12.2 percent), and blacks (24.8
percent), while youth jobless rates changed little for Asians (10.9 percent), and
Hispanics (16.5 percent).
2. For the data, see WALTER E. WILLIAMS, LEGISLATING BLACK UNEMPLOYMENT,
NCPA POLICY REPORT No. 112 (1984), http://www.ncpa.org/pdfs/st112.pdf [http:II
perma.cc/3XAE-REHK].
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Most critically, it is important to be conscious of where the
gaps in our empirical knowledge lie-it is with the uncertainty
as to the relative harm that is done by different measures, act-
ing alone or in tandem. For example, it is very difficult to un-
derstand the adverse impact of a minimum wage law. One
complication is that the impact depends on the gap between
the market wage and the minimum wage. If the former is
above the latter, the effects will be small, because wages can
reach equilibrium. But there may still be workers in a robust
market who are only employable at wages below the minimum
wage, even if they constitute a small fraction of the total. With
some increments in minimum wages, other adaptations of the
employment contract could offset the burden of the regulation:
those workers could be required to work on split shifts, pay for
their own meals, and the like in order to dull the effect of the
high minimum wages. At this point the adverse effect of the
minimum wage law will reflect itself in the reduction of joint
employer-employee surplus, not in the unemployment rate.
But social losses also matter, even if they are much harder to
measure empirically. That said, none of these complications
have to be resolved before making the simple but sensible rec-
ommendation that the removal of all these restraints, which
often operate in tandem, should help move us toward fuller
employment.
There is another way to put the point. A great deal of evidence
suggests that in general, competitive markets outperform mo-
nopoly markets. Therefore, markets that have barriers to entry
are those with monopoly-like characteristics, which impede effi-
ciency. The simple theoretical point here is that competitive
markets essentially exhaust all the gains from trade. Where there
are many people on one side of the market buying or selling
widgets, people will search for the ideal trading partner. The
fewer the impediments to entry and exit, the more likely it is that
people will start to reach ideal kinds of results. You will never
get to perfection because transaction costs are always positive,
but they can be reduced, and I like to think that the Coase Theo-
rem stands for the proposition that the best way to improve so-
cial welfare is to minimize transaction costs.3
3. Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
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It is also important in this context to be careful in choosing the
definition of a competitive market. Apart perhaps from a few
commodity markets, there are no perfectly competitive markets
anywhere. Labor markets are no exception to that rule. Workers
are not perfect fungible in the way that shares of stock are fungi-
ble. Nor are they mobile in the way capital is mobile. As Profes-
sor Verkerke stressed in his remarks, ordinary people have other
identities that interact with their status as employees. People
have spousal issues, family attachments, personal disabilities,
and all sorts of unique characteristics that impact their individu-
al choices. But no matter how significant these personal features,
they do not undermine the simpler point that for any given
worker there are many job opportunities, just as for any given
employer they are many different job applicants. The slippages
that one observes in labor markets are of theoretical interest but
of relatively little practical importance. Competitive labor mar-
kets are never, for example, the subject of an antitrust inquiry on
the ground that some firm has dominant control in a particular
market. The automobile and the commuter bus and train put an
end to that. It is therefore important to remember that there is
nothing in a minimum wage law, or indeed, in any other form of
regulation that makes matters more competitive. The restraints
on entry make them less competitive. There is no pressing social
need to spend large government resources to make employment
more difficult.
The same argument applies with respect to other distortions
that are already in labor markets, including various programs
such as the earned income tax credit, social security, Medicaid,
or food stamps. This brief article is not the place to examine
these forms of government intervention for their own merits.
But it makes no sense in my view to take the position that we
should add another set of regulations whose likely effect is only
to make matters more difficult than they already are. Second-
best arguments that take the form "we now have to do A be-
cause we have just done B" should receive short shrift in policy
discussions. If A is a mistake, the first-best alternative is to re-
move it. The effort to create clever offsets is usually counterpro-
ductive. The original distortion remains and new ones are add-
ed, which then become the engine for still further programs.
The common argument, for example, that it is good to ex-
pand welfare programs to offset the loss of jobs attributable to
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minimum wages is a species of that dangerous reasoning. The
two populations are not easy to identify, and there is every rea-
son to think that each of these programs has its own tax and
regulatory difficulties. If these programs are to be justified it
should be on a stand-alone basis, not as part of a complex
package. All too often economists resort to the theory of sec-
ond-best to make the technically true claim that so long as there
is one distortion in the market, it is impossible to say whether
adding a second will make things better or worse. There is of
course no theoretical way to refute this point. But the difficulty
with it is that it is a showstopper in every case. Does anyone
believe that it is fine for New York City to have rent stabiliza-
tion because there are tariffs on imported beef or steel? The far
better approach is to identify the market failure or externality
that needs correction and address it directly. If there is a short-
age of information about job listings, introduce-or better yet
have a private party introduce-a listing service that will re-
duce the cost of search. There is no need for any regulation on
these grounds.
As should be evident from this discussion, evidence about
market structure and market imperfections that may prove rel-
evant to a general inquiry on regulation writ-large is hard to
deal with. But it is important to note that the lessons that come
from outside the labor law area will not prove supportive of
labor regulation unless rent and price control are regarded as a
models that justify the minimum wage. No matter where we
look, it is a good working assumption that any form of gov-
ernment action that pulls us further from a competitive equilib-
rium should be resisted. From this it does not follow that all
forms of regulation should be rejected. In some markets, simple
writing requirements could lead to a greater efficiency in mar-
kets, be it for labor or real estate, by reducing the costs of dis-
pute resolution. It would, for example, be a gross error to con-
fuse a statute of frauds, whose writing requirement has this
objective, with a minimum wage law that does not. It is one
thing to reduce the cost of ex post enforcement by taking ex
ante precautions. It is quite another to reduce the opportunities
for gains through trade by imposing many restrictions on labor
markets.
Now it is of course the case that there are some markets, out-
side the labor area, in which it is not possible to reach a com-
No. 3] 793
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petitive equilibrium. That is generally true in network indus-
tries, where each party has to interconnect with its actual and
potential competitors. But it does not take much empirical evi-
dence to distinguish an employment market from a telecom-
munications or transportation market, where these difficulties
can arise. In labor markets, there is no reason to be worried
about monopoly practices in the absence of government regula-
tion. Even a firm in a network industry has to hire workers in
competition with other employers, meaning that it may have
some monopoly power in product or service markets, but none
in labor markets. So this is an area where the general theory of
economics cautions against public intervention on the terms
and conditions of employment contracts. The purpose of regu-
lations that are imposed should not be to frustrate contracts,
but to reduce the impediments to their formation. Every time
the law decides to "protect" certain people, its effort backfires.
Thus the minimum wage law that protects people from low
wages, protects them from getting any job at all.
The same logic applies to those protections that kick in for-
mally only after workers have taken a job. A common form of
that protection is protection from unjust dismissal. The law
may well render tenure somewhat more secure than otherwise,
but by the same token, it reduces the probability that one will
get the job in the first place. Employers are repetitive players in
markets. Even if they do not grasp the point instantly, one bad
experience provides inoculation against others. The lesson that
is quickly learned is that the inability to fire at will increases
the cost of hiring workers who are high risk. The ex post pro-
tection turns out to be an ex ante disadvantage, which is why
for so many years, very much against the grain, I have been in
favor of the contract at will, which preserves needed flexibility
for the benefit of employer and employee alike.4
I think this conclusion ties in neatly with my basic theory. If
we look around at labor markets, the most common type of ar-
rangement is of course the contract at will, that allows an em-
ployer to fire, and a worker to quit, for good reason, bad reason,
or no reason at all. One simple feature about this contract is that
4. See Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract At Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 747
(1984).
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the threat to quit or fire is always there. Getting a new employee
is difficult, as is finding a job, so that both parties have an incen-
tive to preserve the relationship. Often that simple dynamic
means that contracts that can be terminated at the blink of an eye
can often last for years. Indeed, the incentives to behave well are
larger because of the heavy reputational costs that can arise from
arbitrary and capricious behavior. These apply on both sides of
the deal, but they are likely to be stronger constraints on the em-
ployer, especially of a large firm, that is constantly in the labor
market. For a firm to get a reputation as a bad place to work is
very costly to overcome. And so it is that informal constraints
without legal remedies can do an effective job in disciplining
behavior-in labor contracts as everywhere else.
To be sure, there is no reason to force all contracts to take this
form, but the frequency of the arrangement suggests that it
should be the default arrangement. Many of the deviations
from this form will preserve the at-will feature for termination,
but will often require that the employer pay some fixed sever-
ance paid, often tied to some combination of years of service
and final salary. The point of these deals is that they allow for
clean termination because there is no need to calculate conse-
quential damages or demand that the employee take difficult
steps to mitigate damages. It is of course possible to add "for
cause" provisions for termination into any employment, but
their relative infrequency suggests that parties to voluntary
transactions do not want to litigate the break-up, given that the
costs are necessarily shared between them.
Now, once state regulation is introduced into labor relations,
there are three parties to every employment contract, one of
which has all sorts of powers that are never granted to any or-
dinary private business. Oftentimes it is said, especially with
labor contracts, that we should not fear the government. After
all most employers and employees are strongly against all
forms of race and sex discrimination for the simple reason that
it is bad for business whether or not we have an employment
discrimination law. In these cases, the argument is made that
the law serves the benevolent function of tracking and enforc-
ing social norms. For these purposes, it does not matter which
of these social norms I accept or reject, but the following caveat
holds in all cases. No matter how desirable the social norm, no
matter how strong the consensus behind its application, the last
No. 3]
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thing that the laws should do is harden the social norm into a
legal command which goes against the grain of the contractual
choices of the private parties. The problem is with second order
effects. Legal norms are not self-enforcing, nor are they evi-
dent. There could easily be factual disputes that the third party
cannot understand. It is easy to miss some social norms from
the outside. It is possible that norms will evolve more rapidly
than the law itself. Hence the threat of legal enforcement will
change primary practices even before the law is asserted, for at
the very least documentation of behaviors and practices reduc-
es the level of informality at which businesses can run, and the
extra costs are divided in uncertain proportions between the
party. There are also additional taxpayer-funded public ex-
penditures that are themselves a wedge in contracting behav-
ior. There are reasons why parties set out some terms explicitly
and leave others to the be worked out informally. That option
is effectively eliminated when government oversight comes in.
All these matters apply to the youth unemployment market
like any other, only more so. Here workers are inexperienced.
They may be of widely varying quality. It is risky to hire them. It
is in the interest of workers with weak credentials that they be
able to start at low wages so that they can dispel doubts on the
job, which could then lead to promotions as they acquire addi-
tional skills and reputational capital. Freezing workers out at the
ground level means that they cannot gain access to all the non-
pecuniary benefits of the job. The point here applies not only to
workers with little education. It applies also to those with more
education who are willing to work at unpaid internships. 5 They
should be encouraged to do so, because the contacts and skills
they acquire can easily lead to paying jobs with the firms that
run the internships, or to getting skills that can be used else-
where. The benefits of laws banning unpaid internships in prac-
tice do not go to the workers they are claimed to protect, but, as
intended, to their union competitors, who can usually acquire
higher wages, and in any event do not take unpaid internship
5. For some of the complexities, see Sharon A. Snyder, Unpaid Workers-Interns
Under the Fair Labor Standard Act, MARYLAND STATE BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW NEWSLETTER, Spring 2013, available at http:/f
www.ober.com/publications/2228-unpaid-workers---intems-under-fair-labor-
standards-act [http://perma.cc/CD4L-2FG4].
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jobs. So there is yet another empirical truth: rules that are sold as
protecting the regulated parties are often supported by their di-
rect competitors who are not similarly burdened by the laws.
Well, how does one reform the law? The modem answer is to
propose half-measures, which depend on ad hoc exceptions to
the rule, such as allowing flex time or a limited youth exemption
under the FLSA. But these measures add complexity without
getting to the root of the problem. And they will surely do little
to stem the constant flow of well-crafted lawsuits under the Fair
Labor Standards Act, which should be rejected as a failed social
experiment that only chills a labor market that needs to expand,
and which should be instantly repealed. Once repeal is done,
employers and employees can decide whether they want flex
time or overtime. Employers will be able to hire people on part-
time or permanent basis, without having constantly to satisfy
somebody inside the government whose external norms are not
based on anything which you would remotely call empirical ev-
idence. What these rules are based upon is at best a theoretically
consistent a priori vision of what they regard to be the just socie-
ty that they're prepared to impose on everybody else. They are
certainly not based on empirical research of any form.
I think that the same analysis applies to employment discrim-
ination laws, which again I have long opposed.6 Is it really the
case a priori that we are absolutely positive that anybody who
decides to discriminate on any grounds-race, sex, and so
forth-is in fact behaving in an inappropriate manner? I do not
think that need be the case at all. It may well be that in certain
kinds of jobs, women do better than men. It may be true that
older people are better than younger people at certain jobs. It
may well be that there are consumer preferences that actually
matter especially in the provision of intimate personal services
which give rise for discrimination based on sex, race, religion or
national origin. Let voluntary sorting take place and it is not
clear that men will always be preferred to women, or the re-
verse. The same is true with age, and even the hot-button topics
of race and national origin. What is likely without a labor law is
a more efficient matching of workers with jobs and workers with
6. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992).
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clients. Indeed, workplace dynamics matter, and one of the
strongest arguments for the repeal of Title VII and similar laws,
including the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, is that
repeal will facilitate a variety of special recruitment, affirmative
action, and diversity programs that a resourceful firm looking
for a market edge can introduce on their own initiative-without
having to run the gauntlet of getting approval from the Com-
missioners of the EEOC or any similar organization.
In speaking against employment discrimination laws, I freely
confess that I do not know what the ideal configuration of
workers is for any given firm. But that is precisely the reason
why the laws are so dangerous. The EEOC does not know that
either, but it tries to fix a problem that it does not understand.
Viewed in this light, the advantage of freedom of contract is
that people with better knowledge on the ground can outper-
form the EEOC, whose five commissioners have no extensive
practical knowledge in most labor areas. It is yet another appli-
cation of the basic principle that decentralized decision making
will work better than government operation because the gov-
ernment suffers from two incurable disadvantages: It has nei-
ther the incentive nor the knowledge to make the right trade-
offs in complex situations.7 It is by no means the case that all
employers, or indeed any, will behave in a retrograde fashion
without antidiscrimination laws. Why should anyone think
that an antidiscrimination law is needed for gay and lesbian
workers when most employers are way ahead of the game in
introducing specially-tailored programs that would not be re-
quired by any antidiscrimination laws? Nor does it matter if
some groups for religious or other reasons choose not to enter
that market for gay or lesbian workers. What matters is the
number of opportunities that any person has, not the number
of places where he or she cannot work. Better an expanded la-
bor market that offers countless jobs, some of which are open
to subsets of the population, than a labor market with fewer
opportunities available to all. People gravitate to the people
who prize their skills, not to those who do not.
7. With the inevitable citation, Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Socie-
ty, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945).
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On this point, I remember years ago a friend of mine who
ran a large public corporation told me his views on hiring.
Here was his blunt message: "Look, 35 percent of the work-
force is white male, and I've got to hire God knows how many
people every year. I can't just concentrate on that group. I have
to make this place congenial to everybody, and if I don't have
people in my workforce who can work with anybody who
comes in, they're no good to me." Well, this set of understand-
ings is a way in which you can enforce a non-discrimination
principle in a robust and contextual manner in large corpora-
tions. It works because the CEO really wants it, and it spreads
up and down the ranks. These attitudes last when internally
generated. They are suspect when imposed from without by
decrees from uninformed government agents whose power is
inverse to their knowledge.
What is instructive in this regard is that the government's
position has never held with respect to age discrimination.
Here the practice before the passage of the ADEA was for most
firms to have firm retirement rules for virtually all workers
from top to bottom. The decision to end a relationship did not
put workers out to sea, because the employment contract dove-
tailed with the pension programs (including Social Security)
that were designed on their behalf. Nor did the employer act
like a legislature that banned these workers from taking new
jobs at other firms, which is the norm in England where it
wreaks havoc with overall labor markets by shutting people
out for no good reasons. In the United States, workers who re-
tired from one business could work for another, or even start
their own business.
When there is an employment practice as uniform as manda-
tory retirement, there are only two possible reactions. The first
is that the market, that is, the countless employers in the mar-
ket, all suffer from some collective delusion that leads them to
systematically undervalue the contributions of older workers.
But that is not remotely plausible. These are not combined
judgments by a small group that speaks for all firms. These are
independent judgments made by a large class of firms, and
they have good reason to change that judgment if it is incorrect.
Their local knowledge dominates any knowledge that any gov-
ernment commission could have of the subject. The second ex-
planation is best. They actually know what they are doing.
No. 3]
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What then is the explanation for the practice? Here the sim-
plest point is that often times there is a natural cycle to work-
ers. Keeping older workers on makes it more difficult for
younger workers to advance in orderly fashion to higher posi-
tions. In addition, it is often wise to replace people before they
start to deteriorate rather than waiting until the time that per-
formance levels start to dip, at which point there could be ex-
tensive loss in productivity and morale, until some cumbrous
procedure is put in place to resolve the dispute on some indi-
viduated grounds. It is easy to state that workers can only be
fired for cause, but that principle is devilishly hard to apply
especially when the loss of efficiency could take place at an in-
creasing rate. The advantage of a fixed retirement rule for all-
which most companies have for their senior workers under an
exemption from the ADEA-is that it does not cast needless
aspersions on the workers let go and does not involve the firm
in ugly internal fights as to who should stay and who should
go. So long as labor markets are left unregulated, there should
be a voluntary sorting after a mandated retirement in which
good workers get picked up by other firms that can make that
kind of individuated judgment about a given worker without
having to make invidious comparisons with his or her cowork-
ers. How strong these arguments are is likely to vary from case
to case. But what matters for the legal judgment is that these
variations are not amenable to an ADEA-type regulatory
scheme. Do nothing via government and the problem will take
care of itself at the firm level.
In dealing with this issue, Professor Verkerke cites a study
indicating that it is wrong to assume that higher retention rates
for older workers necessarily results in a loss of entry level po-
sitions.9 I suspect that is true for the simple reason that there is
relatively little overlap in the skill sets of two classes of work-
ers so that it is unlikely that one should be regarded as a close
substitute for the other. In general it is unwise to draw any in-
ference about the desirability of the ADEA from this one nega-
8. See Jonathan Gruber, Kevin Miligan & David A. Wise, Introduction and Summary
to SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAMS AND RETIREMENT AROUND THE WORLD: THE RELA-
TIONSHIP To YOUTH EMPLOYMENT (Jonathan Gruber & David A. Wise eds., 2010).
9. See J.H. Verkerke, Employment Regulation and Youth Employment: A Critical
Perspective, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 801, 805-06 (2015).
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tive finding. The first reason is that this finding is not likely to
apply in all submarkets with equal force. Thus in the academic
market, in my view the ADEA has had very bad effects because
it does influence the rate of substitution between senior faculty
and junior faculty. Here the skill sets are relatively similar and
hence the rates of substitution are far higher. When I worked
on this issue extensively at the University of Chicago around
1990,11 it was widely assumed that the salary of an entry-level
employee at age thirty to thirty-five was about half of that of a
senior employee at age seventy or so. Yet on average, with no-
table exceptions, the productivity of the older professor was on
the decline. The ability to take on graduate students for multi-
ple-year commitments was impaired. Work in new fields was
diminished. Influence over new hires could be inordinate. The
ability to guide the long-term policy of the department or uni-
versity was compromised. In private I could not find a single
administrator who was in favor of lifting the cap on mandatory
retirement. In fact, quite the opposite, they all rushed to intro-
duce buyout programs for senior faculty that could pave the
way for the more rapid deployment of younger faculty, which
is something that a university would not do if it desperately
wanted to hang on to senior faculty as a group. But by the same
token I could not find one who was prepared to speak out
against that proposal, given the heat that would be generated
in the other direction.
The situation is different in other industries. In many cases,
employees opt strongly for early retirement, so there is no fear of
a displacement effect. In other cases, the law does not apply, as
to partners and senior executives. The clear point here is that the
motivations that influence job retention decisions for senior
workers, and the overall legal environment in which these deci-
sions are made, is vastly different at the end of the employment
cycle than it is at the beginning. It is therefore a mistake to as-
sume that if the ADEA did not have much effect on labor rate
participation at the top, other forms of employment regulation
would also have very little effect at the bottom. That is just not
so. Entry level workers have a different set of issues in establish-
10. For some then-contemporary reflections, see Richard A. Epstein & Saunders
Mac Lane, Keep Mandatory Retirement for Tenured Faculty, REGULATION, Spring
1991, at 85.
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ing work habits, proving their reliability, and getting a first job.
Those are not the difficulties at the top. So again, these statutes
are complex and in general the ADEA is, unfortunately, easy to
enforce, which is why in the areas where it cuts against the
standard contractual solutions it is very costly to adopt given its
dislocations from voluntary norms.
So the lesson should be clear. Empirical studies only matter if
they seek to verify some theoretical proposition that relates to
the efficiency of various labor markets. The substitution effects
are theoretically of little importance in dealing with an assess-
ment of the ADEA and similar statutes. What matters here is
the first principle. The heavy burden falls on those who wish to
regulate labor markets. With minimum wage and employment
discrimination laws that burden has not been met. What we do
have unfortunately is an ugly cycle. First, the government puts
one set of restrictions in place, and it discovers that unem-
ployment rates get higher or income levels get lower, or labor
participation goes down. But once the bad news is absorbed,
the regulators never agree to repeal what's already there. They
just add another layer on top of that existing layer. As Gail
Heriot said, and said correctly, in her remarks: individually
these things are bad; together, they have negative synergies.1
The best response today to labor market regulation comes
straight from Moses: "Let my people go."
11. See Gail Heriot, Working Backwards: How Employment Regulation Hurts the
Unemployed, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 781 (2015).
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